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THE FUNCTION OF "DYSFUNCTIONAL" BOARDS 
Franklin A. Gevurtz* 
l. INTRODUCTION 
For many years , there was a scholar-in-residence on the Pacific 
McGeorge faculty named Abbott Goldberg. Abbot told me about a 
classmate of his at Harvard Law School, Louis Henkin, who ultimately 
became a University Professor (with the right to teach in any 
department) at Columbia University. Recognizing Henkin's utter 
brilliance , even as first year law student, Abbott asked Henkin what his 
approach was to studying law. Henkin answered that he outlined the 
substance of his courses. When Abbott seemed unimpressed, Henkin 
continued, "And then I outline the outlines." After Abbott asked what 
the next step was, Henkin explained, "And then I outline the outline of 
the outlines. " Abbott then said, "Don ' t tell me, you then outline the 
outline of the outline of the outlines?" to which Henkin replied, "Now 
you got it". Henkin then explained that his goal was to continue this 
process until he reduced the entire first year of law school to one word. 
Intrigued , Abbott asked if Henkin had succeeded , and, after receiving an 
affirmative response , Abbott asked for the word. Playing coy, Henkin 
replied , "What, does Macy's tell Gimbels its secrets for selling clothes?" 
Nevertheless, Henkin relented. First, however, Henkin asked Abbott if 
Abbott knew Yiddish, to which Abbott pointed out that Abbott's last 
name was Goldberg . According to Henkin , the one word that 
summari zed the entire first year of law school is a Yiddish word; this 
word is "nu" , which roughly translates as "so." 
Abbott passed away a few years ago and I have been looking for an 
occasion to remember him by telling this story. This Symposium finally 
provid ed the opportunity, because this one Yiddish word , "nu ," 
summarize s the thesis of my paper. When asked about my reaction to 
the boardroom "scandal" at Hewlett-Packard, as I was by a couple of 
report ers at that time, I confess that what I really wanted to say was "nu" 
or, in English , "so." In this paper, I will explain why. 
One usage of the expression nu is to convey a lack of surprise at a 
fact; or, perhap s more precisel y, some disappointment that the person to 
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whom the comment is directed is surprised by a fact. Accordingly , the 
first part of this paper examines whether complaints about dysfunctional 
boards of directors are really anything new. In fact, such complaints 
seem to be as old and as widespread as the institution of corporate 
boards themselves. 
The more profound usage of the expression nu and the usage that 
Henkin realized underlay all of legal education is to communicate the 
need, in every situation , to reexamine fundamental premises. In the 
context of this Symposium, we cannot examine the causes or cures of 
board dysfunction unless and until we agree on what is dysfunctional; 
and we cannot agree on what is dysfunctional until we agree on what the 
board's function is . It turns out , however, that it is by no means clear 
just what the board's real function is supposed to be, and therefore it is 
not clear when we should consider a board to be dysfunctional. This is 
the subject of the second part of this paper. 
II. THE UNIVERSALITY OF NON-FUNCTIONAL BOARDS: OR SO WHAT ELSE 
Is "Nu" 
Prompted by the corporate scandals of 2001 and 2002, with the 
examples of somnolent directors at Enron and Worldcom , there was a 
great gnashing of teeth and wailing of complaints about what had gone 
wrong with corporate boards. 1 This led me to ask how the basic model 
of corporate governance throughout the world, 2 came to call for 
management under a board of directors 3 elected (normally) by the 
shareholders. 4 As I researched the historical origins of the corporate 
1. E.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern 
Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1233, 1241-42 (2002) (Enron's 
board was "a splendid board on paper," and its failure "reveal(s) a certain weakness with the board as a 
governance mechanism."); The Way We Govern Now- Corporate Boards, ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 2003, at 
59 (discussion of poor board governance in light of corporate scandals involving Enron); Joseph Fuller 
& Michael C. Jensen, What's A Director To Do? (Harvard Negotiation, Organization and Markets 
Research, Paper No. 02-38, 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=357722 ("The recent 
wave of corporate scandals provides continuing evidence that boards have failed to fulfill their role as 
the top-level corporate control mechanism"). 
2. See, e.g., RICHARD M. BUXBAUM & KLAUS J. HOPT, LEGAL HA_RMONIZATION AND THE 
BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: CORPORATE AND CAPITAL MARKET LAW HARMONIZATION POLICY IN EUROPE 
AND THE U.S.A. 182-84 (I 988)(discussing the prevailing use of corporate boards in Europe); Howard 
Gensler, Company Formation and Securities Listing in the People's Republic of China, 17 Hous. J. Int' ! 
L. 399, 420-2 1 (1995) (discussing the requirement for a corporate board in China); Christopher Lee 
Heftel, Corporate Govemance in Japan : The Position of Shareholde rs in Publicly Held Corporations, 5 
U. HAW. L. REV. 135, 138-40, 153- 54 (1983) (discussing the requirement for a corporate board in 
Japan). 
3. E.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT§ 8.01; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (a) (2008). 
4. E.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.03(c); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (b) (2008). The 
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board, 5 and how this mode of corporate governance spread throughout 
the world, 6 it soon became clear that wherever and whenever corporate 
board have existed, boards have provoked complaints about their failure 
to function properly. 
I should not have been surprised to find that the history of corporate 
boards is marked by the evident failure of the institution to function as 
envisioned. Not long before I entered the field of corporate law, 
scholars, such as my former teacher, Melvin Eisenberg,7 argued that the 
limited time available to outside directors; management's control over 
the agenda and information received by the board; biases introduced by 
various relationships between directors and management; and 
management's control over the process of director selection, combined 
to undermine the effectiveness of corporate boards either as a decision 
making institution or as an institution that monitors management. 
Studies by Robert Gordon in the l 960s 8 and Miles Mace in the l 970s 9 
provided empirical support for the conclusion that boards were largely 
passive pawns of management, and had no real role in running the 
corporation. 10 
There is nothing in either the Gordon or the Mace studies to suggest 
that director passivity was a recent phenomenon in the 1960s or 1970s. 
In 1934, William Douglas wrote a classic article complaining about 
directors who did not direct. 11 Furthermore, such complaints are not 
limited to boards in the United States; similar complaints are heard 
about boards in Japan, 12 Germany, 13 and France 14~hardly undeveloped 
primary exception to the shareholder election of directors is the Gem1an invented system of co-
determination, under which employees elect up to half of the corporation's directors. See, e.g., 
FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, GLOBAL ISSUES IN CORPORATE LAW 63-64 (2006). 
5. Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of 
Directors, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89 (2004). 
6. Franklin A. Gevurtz, The European Origins and Spread of the Co1porate Board of Directors, 
33 STETSON L. REV. 925 (2004). 
7. E.g., MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 149- 85 (1977). 
8. ROBERT AARON GORDON, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION 143 (1966) 
(the board of directors in the typical large corporation does not actively exercise an important part in the 
leadership function). 
9. See MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTHS AND REALITY 107 (1971) (study finding that 
directors rarely challenged or monitored CEO performance, but instead often served as little more than 
"attractive ornaments on the corporate Christmas tree"); Myles L. Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality--
Ten Years Later, 32 RUT. L. REV. 293 ( 1979) (study reaffirmed results of earlier study as to director 
passivity). 
I 0. This discussion focuses on the board in the widely held, rather than the closely held, 
corporation. In the case of a closely held corporation, the board commonly consists of the major 
shareholders, who often run the firm much as partners. See F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. 
THOMPSON, O'NEAL AND THOMPSON'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCs § 1.07 (3d ed. 2004). 
11. William 0. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1305 (1934). 
12. E.g., Oxford Analytica Ltd., BOARD DIRECTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: TRENDS IN 
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nations that one would assume have weak institutions of corporate 
governance. Such dissatisfaction with corporate boards and directors is 
not a twentieth century phenomenon. In the nineteenth century the 
notion of directors being blindly oblivious to stock swindles had 
sufficiently pervaded the public consciousness to form part of a classic 
work of English literature. 15 Likewise, at around the same time, half a 
world away, one could read criticisms in Japanese economic journals 
about inaction by directors of Japanese companies. 16 
Of course, the fact that large corporations have prospered, and have 
contributed to modern economic prosperity, suggests that there must be 
something right about the management structure of corporations -
notwithstanding complaints arising from periodic corporate meltdowns. 
Still, it is difficult to read the work of economic historians without 
concluding that the managerial developments that made corporations 
work are those- like the development of the U-form and M-form 
organizational structure-that occurred below the level of the board of 
directors. 17 
G7 COUNTRIES OVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS (1992), reprinted in ROBERT A. G. MONKS & NELL 
MINNOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 267 (2d ed. 2001) (stating that in Japan formal authority is held by 
the company president and the board of directors , but board meetings are infrequent and decisions are 
rubber stam ped; real authority is held by the president and the operating committee composed of the 
president's immediate subo rdinates). 
13. E.g., Mark J. Roe , Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Control, 53 STAN. 
L. REV. 539, 568 (2000) (Gemrnn corporate supervisory boards meet infrequently and their information 
has been weak). 
14. E.g., MONKS & MINNOW, supra note 12, at 292 (the president director-general (PDG) of 
French companies wields almost unchecked contro l over the enterprise without the counter power of the 
board, whose composition and agenda the PDG controls; indeed, it is regarded as bad manner s for the 
board to vote on a management decision). 
15. E.g., ANTHONY TROLLOPE, THE WAY WE LIVE Now 298-309 (1875). "Melmotte [the chief 
executive officer of the company, and perpetrator of a fraudulent promotion ,] would speak a few slow 
words ... always indicative of triumph, and then everybody would agre e to everything, somebody 
would sign something, and the 'Boa rd ' ... would be over." Id. at 138. 
16. Tsunehiko Yui, The Development of the Organizational Structure of Top Managemenl in 
Meiji Japan, in 1 JAPANESE Y.B. ON BUS. HtSTORY I , 7 (1984) . (referring to Ukichi Taguchi, the 
publisher of the Tokyo Keizai Zasshi, then Japan's most influential economic journal, who wrote in 
1884, "directors [of Japanese banks] might as well be retired .. . . [T]he president handles everything 
himself."). 
17. See RICHARDS. TEDLOW, THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION 13-24 , 56-
60 (1991 ). While the universal adoption of board governance for public corporations mak es it difficult to 
perform an emp irica l study on the impact of proceeding without a board, various recent studies attempt 
to assess the impact of board composition and other corporate governance practices on corpo rate 
performance . Much of the results have been inconc lusive. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The 
Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance , 54 Bus. LA w. 921 ( 1999) 
(reviewing over I 00 studies and finding no convin c ing evidence that independent direcJors improve firm 
performance); Robert W. Hamilton , Co,porate Governance in America 1950-2 000: Major Changes bu/ 
Uncertain Benefits, 25 J. CORP. L. 349, 359- 73 ( 1999) (studies have not produced consistent positive 
results from changes in corporate governance , suc h as increased use of independent directors). Studies in 
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III. THE FUNCTION OF CORPORATE BOARDS: OR, "Nu," WH AT Do You 
THINK THE BOARD Is SUPPOS ED TO Do? 
Interestingly, one reporter who contacted me after the Hewlett-
Packard scandal broke did so because he read my article on the history 
of the board of directors. He was the editor-at-large for Fortune 
Magazine, and he explained that he and other reporter s working on the 
Hewlett-Packard story had gotten into a conversation about why 
corporations have boards of directors. These reporters had hit upon a 
critical insight: One cannot assess the significanc e of the so-called 
scandal at Hewlett-Packard without understanding the role of the board , 
and one cannot understand the role of the board without understanding 
the board's history. 18 
A. Ostensible Functions 
The earliest general corporation laws called upon the board to manage 
the corporation. 19 Recognizing that boards can hardly conduct day-to-
day management of any business ,20 modem corporate statutes call for 
management of the corporation "by or under the direc tion of' the 
board. 21 Traditionally, it is said that the board sets corporate policy, 
makes the major decisions, and delegates to management the task of 
carrying out policy and those decisions. 22 The Gordon and Mace studies 
demonstrated that this "tradition" is a myth: Management sets policy and 
even makes major decisions, the role of the board is reduced to 
less develop ed economies suggest perhap s a greater impac t. Mark Mobius , Issues in Global Co,porate 
Governance, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN ASIA-PACIFIC CRITIQUE 47-48 (Low Chee Kcong ed., 
2002) (recent studies in emerging markets show be tter stock performance of companies with so-ca lled 
better corporate governa nce , including more independe nt boards) . Nevert he less, it is difficult to say how 
mu ch of this result co mes from having a board versus from hav ing other so-ca lled good corporate 
governance pra ctices; how much improv ed mark et returns retlect d current desire by inves tors for stoc k 
of co mpan ies with so-called better corporate gove rnance practices , and how much retlects actual 
impro ved performance by such corporations. 
18. For the outgrowth of thi s conversation , see Posting of Justin Fox to The Curious Cap ita list, 
Who Needs a Board of Directors Anyway ?, http: //curiouscapitalist.blog s.time .com /2006 /09 /20/who_nee 
ds_ a_board_of_dire ctors/ (Sept. 20, 2006 , 11 :40 EST). See also James Surow ieck, Zip It, NEW YORKER 
3 1 (Oct. 9, 2006) , availab le al http ://www.newyor ke r.co m/arch ive/2006/l 0/09/061009ta_ talk_surowie 
ck i (citing Gevurtz, supra note 5, for the proposition tha t there have always been complaints about 
corporate boards); Posting of Justin Fox to The Curious Capi talist, Is Corporale Governance Really 
Broken, http ://cu riousca pitalist.blogs.tirn e .com/2006 /09/26/is _ corporate _gove rnance_ really / (Sept. 28, 
2006, 11 :34 EST) (replying to Stephen Bainbrid ge's crit icism of the essay "Who Needs a Board of 
Directors Anyway''). 
19. 18 11 N.Y. Sess . Laws ch. LXVII (McKin ney) . 
20. E.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT§ 8.0l(b) crnt (2005) . 
2 1. E.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT§ 8.0l(b) (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 14l(a) (2008) . 
22. E.g., FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW§ 3. l.5a, at 229- 30 (2000). 
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providing formal approval (almost never disapproval) of those policies 
and decisions. 23 
The fact that corporate boards do not actually manage the corporation, 
or make business decisions , has led many to ask what then is the 
function of the board. Borrowing, consciously or unconsciously , from 
the German supervisory board ,24 the view that arose in the 1970s was 
that the primary function of the board was to monitor corporate 
management. 25 This view of the board observes that in the publicly held 
corporation there are too many scattered shareholders for the 
shareholders themselves to efficiently monitor whether senior corporate 
managers are running the company honestly and competently on the 
shareholder's behalf. This, in tum, suggests that the purpose for having a 
corporate board elected by the shareholders is to perform such 
monitoring on shareholders' behalf. 26 Yet, to say that the board's 
function is to monitor management does not say precisely what the 
board is supposed to do. If all the board does is to observe , then what 
does this accomplish? Borrowing from the German model , perhaps the 
key action accompanying the monitoring model is the hiring and firing 
of senior management , particularly the chief executive officer. 27 
The monitoring model seems to provide an elegant rationale for a 
shareholder-elected board. Yet, the model rests upon a rather curious 
assumption, specifically, that shareholders, who are too numerous and 
disengaged to monitor management on their own behalf, will become 
sufficiently engaged and organized to select vigilant directors to perform 
the monitoring. As has been recognized since the famous work by Berle 
and Means, 28 · however, the reality is that management, and not 
shareholders, generally selects the directors. 29 Needless to say, 
management has limited incentives to select directors who will 
aggressively monitor management. The predictable result has been that 
boards traditionally have been only slightly more active in monitoring 
23. See supra notes 8 9. See also Bayles s Manning, The Business Judgmen/ Rule and !he 
Direclor 's Duly of A11enlion: Time flJr Reality, 39 BUS. LAW. 1477, 1483 84 ( 1984). 
24. See. e.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 4, at 67 69. 
25. See PRINClrLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RLCOMMENDAl'IONS § 3.02 
( 1994); EISENBERG, supra note 7, nt 169- 70. 
26. E.g., Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separa1iu1111/0w11er.1hip and Co111rol, 26 J.L. & 
ECON. 30 l, 3 II ( 1983). 
27. See, e.g., GllVURTZ, .l'llpru note 4, at 67 (discussing rights of the German supervisory board); 
GEVURTZ, supra note 22. § 3. l .5h(2), at 233 (suggesting that corporate boards might do better to focus 
their attention on hiring and firing the CEO). 
28. ADOLPII A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, TllE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY ( 1932). 
29. E.g., James D. Westphal & Edward J. Zajac, Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power. 
Demographic Similarity, and New Director Selection, 40 ADMIN . SCI. Q. 60, 78 ( 1995). 
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than they have been in managing. 30 Optimists may respond by pointing 
to high profile sackings of CEOs in recent years,31 suggesting that 
boards are finally taking their monitoring role seriously- at least after a 
CEO has been given plenty of time to wreak corporate havoc. Whether 
or not this turns out to be a true renaissance for the corporate board, this 
illustrates at least one unquestioned residual function of corporate 
boards. Like the College of Cardinals selects the successor Pope, the 
board selects the successor CEO. 
Occasionally, another function has been claimed for the corporate 
board: to mediate among shareholders and other corporate constituencies 
such as managers, other employees, creditors, and perhaps even the 
community at large. While strains of this notion go back, at least in the 
United States, to the famous Berle-Dobbs debate in ~he Harvard Law 
Review,32 a recent article by Lynn Stout33 attempts to find empirical 
evidence that shareholders grant power to the board for this reason. 
Specifically, Professor Stout argues that shareholder acquiescence in 
devices, such as poison pills, that insulate boards from shareholder 
30. E.g., MONKS & MINNOW, supra note 12, at 209 ("The primary conclusion of this chapter is 
that America's boards of directors have, more often than not, failed to protect shareholders' interests."); 
Rita Komik, Greenmail: A Study of Board Performance in Corporate Governance, 32 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 
163, 166-67 (1987) (modem board is a "co-opted appendage institution"). 
31. See. e.g., Ted Evanoff, Struggling Ford Ousts Nasser, Installs Auto Heir as Its New CEO, 
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Oct. 31, 200 I, at Cl (Ford board ousted CEO Jacques Nasser because of financial 
losses); Laura Goldberg, Reliant Resources Chief Joins Exodus, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 14, 2003, at Al 
(CEO Steve Letbetter forced to resign as Reliant Resources board agreed it was "time for a change in 
leadership"); Francine Knowles, Adulte,y Crashes Boeing's CEO: Board Ousts Him After Learning of 
an Affair with Female Exec, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 8, 2005, at A3 (Boeing CEO Harry Stonecipher 
forced to resign under board pressure); Bruce Meyerson, Gelling Rid of Bad CEO a Good Idea: Nortel 
Networks Put Investors First by Holding f-lim Responsible/or Losses, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, May 2, 
2004, at E3 (Nortel board fired CEO Frank Dunn because of "accounting turmoil"); Gary Rivlin, 
Hewie/l's Board Forces Chief Out After Rocky Stay, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2005, at Al (Hewlett-Packard 
board forced CEO Carly Fiorina, "one of the nation's best-known business executives and perhaps the 
most powerful woman in corporate America," to resign following disagreements on corporate strategy). 
Interestingly, however, this is not the first time news accounts of sacked CEOs have proclaimed the rise 
of activist boards. See. e.g., Joann S. Lublin, Corporate Chie.f.1· Polish Their Relations with Directors, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 15. 1993, at BI (CEOs arc "significantly revamping their dealings with directors" 
because of recent actions taken by "activist boards"); Joann S. Lublin, More Chief Exec11tive.1· are Being 
Forced Out by Tougher 8oard.1~ Asserlive Outside Directors and a Difficult Economy Lead to Painful 
/Jecisions - 811t It's Sli/1 a Slow Process, WALL ST. J., June 6, 1991, at Al (Growing list of CEO 
departures demonstrates the "rising vigilance of outside directors" nnd "portcnd[s] a power shift in the 
American board room by creating of cadre of activist directors closely aligned with major 
shareholders."). Yet, such earlier spurts of active boards were soon followed by years of silence from the 
boardroom. 
32. See A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom CmyJorate Managers Are Tru.\"tees: A Nore, 45 HARV. L. 
REV. 1365 (1932); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Co17Jorale Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. 
REV.1145(1932). 
33. Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder As Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors in 
Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance , 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667 (2003). 
398 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77 
control 1s evidence that shareholders themselves have concluded that 
boards exist for thi s purpose. 
The question of whether directors should have either a duty or a right 
to look out for the interests of stakeholders in the corporate enterprise 
other than the shareholders (except insofar as doing so advances the 
interests of the shareholders) has been a subject of considerable legal 
and economic policy debate. 34 For present purposes , however, it is 
sufficient to ask whether the composition of the board makes the board 
any more likely to perform this role than that of managing the 
corporation or monitoring corporate management. It would if boards 
were composed of representatives of the various constituents , as, for 
example, under the German system of co-determination. 35 Yet, it is 
difficult to imagine a board selected entirely by one constituency -
whether it is the shareholders by virtue of their right to elect directors, or 
the management by virtue of its practical control over the proxy 
machinery-serving as the honest broker in mediating disputes between 
all corporate stakeholders. 
All told, the corporate board seems to be an institution in search of a 
purpose. The nature of its selection and composition seems to preclude 
its effective functioning in a managing, monitoring, or mediating role. 
B. What the Historica l Origins of the Board Tells Us About the Purposes 
and Functions of the Corporate Board 
Instead of trying to construct a positivist rationalization for what we 
observe boards doing, or theorizing about what boards should be doing, 
it might be more productive to ask how and why an elected board of 
directors came to be the accepted mode of corporate governance. In fact, 
the original purpose for having corporate boards was quite different 
from the purposes discussed above. This insight , in tum , may help 
explain the frustrating dissonance between what corporate law expects 
of boards, and what boards actually do. 
While the Bank of England pioneered the term "directo r,"36 and 
34. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919): Credit Lyonnais Bank 
Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150 , 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 
30, 1991 ); Comm. on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potenrial /or Confusion, 45 Bus. 
LAW. 2253 (1990); Morey W. McDaniel, Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 STETSON L. REV. 121 
(1991). 
35. See supra note 4. 
36. E.g., RONALD RALPH FORMOY, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN COMPANY 
LAW 21 ( 1923) . While the 1618 charter of the Africa Company called for a board of twelve "di rectors," 
this terminology for board members did not catch on until the 1694 charter of the Bank of England. See 
I WILLIAM R. SCOTT, THE CONSTITUTION AND FINANCE OF ENGLISH, SCOTTISH AND )RISH JOINT-
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seemingly influenced American acceptance of corporate board 
govemance, 37 it is the English trading companies that occup y center 
stage in the story of the corporate board. The charters of the famous 
sixteenth and seventeenth century English trading companies (the East 
India Company , the Russia Company, the Eastland Company, the 
Levant Company, the Hudson's Bay Company, and the South Sea 
Company) demonstrate the consistent use of governing boards. 38 This 
shows that the use of corporate governing boards dates back almost half 
a millennium. More significantly, these trading companies played a 
critical role in establishing the use of boards as the governing 
mechanism for the business corporation . Interestingly , this development 
did not involve the boards of these companies; it involved what was 
going on around the boards. These companies were undergoing a 
metamorphosis from so-called regulated companies-e ssentially guilds 
whose membership consisted of merchants conducting independent 
operations under the company 's franchise - into joint stock companies, 
in which voting power and economic return came from investing in a 
common enterprise. While this evolution did not alter the structure of the 
governing board , it did fundamentally change what the board was 
supposed to do. The board transformed from a regulatory body , which 
preserved an exclusive franchise on behalf of a group of merchants who 
conducted individual businesses , into a supervisory body, which had 
overall responsibility for running a business. 
The Eastland Company provides a good example of a regulated 
company. The Eastland Company ' s charter granted the merchants in the 
company the exclusive right among English subjects to trade with 
Scandinavia and the Baltic region. 39 As a regulated company , the 
Eastland Company did not conduct operations as a corporation. Instead , 
the merchants who were the members of the company conducted trading 
operations , either individually or in ad hoc partnerships. 40 This fact leads 
to a critical question from the standpoint of the history of board 
governance: If a regulated company did not conduct operations as a 
corporation, what was the purpo se of having a governing board? The 
answer is that the board adopted ordinances to govern the activities of 
STOCK COMPANIES TO 1720, at 15 1- 52, 205 ( 1912). 
37. E.g., Gcvurt z, supra note 5, at I I 0. 
38. For a tabular li sting of the gove rnan ce stru ctures of Engli sh joint stock co mpanie s until 1720, 
showing predominately board governance, sec 3 WILLIAM R. SCOTT, T HE CONSTITUTION AND FINANCE 
OF ENGLISH, SCOTTI Sii AND )RISH JOINT-STOCK COMP AN I ES TO 1720, at 462- 80 ( 19 12). 
39. E.g., G EORGE CA WSON & A.H. K EANE, THE EARLY CHARTERED COMPANIES 6 1 ( 1896) . 
40. E.g., THO MAS STUART WILLA N, THE EARLY HI STORY OF T HE RUSSIA COMPANY: 1553-
1603, at 19- 20 ( 1959). 
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the members of the company. 41 For example, the board of the Eastland 
Company adopted a prohibition on "colouring" goods. 42 Colouring 
referred to selling goods of a non-member merchant as a member's 
own.43 By operating in this fashion as undisclosed principals, non-
members attempted to circumvent the company's exclusive franchise. 
As this example illustrates, the role of a regulated company's board was 
not to exercise overall responsibility for operating a business, but rather 
to impose rules on individual merchants in order to preserve a 
monopoly. 
The Russia Company may have been the first joint stock company. 44 
In the joint stock company, instead of each merchant trading in his own 
stock (merchandise), the merchants subscribed to a fund that financed a 
combined or joint stock of merchandise for trading by agents of the 
company-hence, the title "joint stock company" from which the current 
label of stockholder is derived. 45 The development of the joint stock 
company, by setting the stage for transferable ownership interests in 
which voting power can depend upon the number of interests purchased 
and in which voting power might become widely dispersed among 
passive investors, obviously had tremendous implications for corporate 
governance; it laid the groundwork for the separation of ownership from 
control. For purposes of this paper, however, dealing as we are with the 
function of the corporate board, the development of the joint stock 
company had another impact. The same board structure that existed to 
enact and enforce rules governing the conduct of independent merchants 
in the regulated company (such as the Eastland Company) found itself 
pressed into service to manage a large business venture in the joint stock 
company (such as the Russia and East India Companies). This occurred 
without any evident consideration to the different nature of these tasks, 
or to whether an institution developed for one task best fit the needs of 
the other . 46 
The use of boards by the sixteenth and seventeenth century English 
trading companies appears to derive from a pattern set by two of the 
earliest companies of English merchants engaged in foreign trade: The 
Company of the Merchants of the Staple and the Company of Merchant 
41. Id. at 20. 
42. See M. SchmitthotT, The Origin of the Joint Stock Company, 3 U. TORONTO. L.J. 74, 82 
(1939). 
43. Id. 
44. E.g., SCOTT, supra note 36, at 17. 
45. For a discussion of the meanings ascribed to the word "stock" in the early joint stock 
companies, see SCOTT, supra note 36, at 158. 
46. WILLAN, supra note 40, at 19- 21. 
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Adventurers. As suggested by the charter of the Merchant Adventurers, 
the boards of the Company of Merchant Adventurers and of the 
Company of the Merchants of the Staple existed to pass ordinances 
regulating the conduct of the members, as well as to resolve disputes 
among the members. 47 Having traced the corporate board to these early 
trading companies, the question becomes from where did these 
companies get the idea for board governance? 
Corporate governance by a representative board, working with a chief 
executive officer (the "governor" in the typical parlance of the early 
corporate charters), is a reflection of political practices and ideas 
widespread in Western Europe in the late middle ages. Specifically, 
while fictional literature often pictures medieval Europe as a place of 
autocratic governance by kings, European political ideology and practice 
in the late middle ages, although hardly democratic, often called for the 
use of collective governance by a body of representatives. Examples of 
such representative governance ideas and practices are found in the 
assemblies or parliaments of medieval Eurofean kingdoms, 48 in town 
councils, 49 in governing councils for guilds,5 and in the Church. 51 The 
unifying theme behind medieval parliaments, town council s, guild 
councils, councils of the Church, and the boards of the trading 
companies, is that they provided the means to comply with the 
"corporate law" rule that "what touches all shall be consented to by all" 
in circumstances when consent by assembly of the entire group was 
impractical. 52 Given this prevalent practice and the ideology that 
underlay this practice, it was natural for the early corporations to use 
board governance. 
In sum then , corporate boards originally were not about running a 
business, or monitoring those who run a business , they were about 
providing political legitimacy through a representative body. Moreover, 
47. E.g., Gevurtz, supra note 5, at 126. 
48. See, e.g., MICHAEL A. R. GRAV ES, TH E PARLIAMENTS OF EARLY MODERN EUROPE 18 
(2001); BRUCE L YON, STUDIES OF WEST EUROPEAN MEDIEVAL INSTITUTIONS 176 (1978); Thomas N . 
Bisson, The Milita,y Origins <if Medieval Representation, 7 1 AM. HI STORICAL REV. 1199 ( 1966). 
49. See, e.g., JOHN H. MUNDY & PETER RmSNEOERG, THE MEDIEVAL TOWN 50 (1958); SUSAN 
REYNOLDS, KIN GDOMS AND COMMUNITIES IN WESTERN EUROPE, 900-1300 , at 191 (2d ed. 1997); 
FRITZ RORIG, THE MEDIEVAL TOWN 26 ( 1967). 
50. See, e.g., LUJO BRENTANO, ON THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF GUILDS AND TIIE 
ORIGINS OF TRADE-UNIONS 62 (1870); Cyril O'Donnell, Origins of the Cmporate Exec:111ive, 26 BULL. 
Bus. HI ST. SOC'Y 55, 63 (1952). 
51. E.g., ANTONY BLA CK, COUNCIL AND COMMUNE: TIIE CONCILAR MOVEMENT AND TIIE 
FIFTEENTH-CENTURY 9 (1979). 
52. See, e.g., ANTONY BLACK, GUILDS AND CIVI L SOCIETY IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 
FROM THE TwELFTH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT 25 (1984); B rian Tierney, Medieval Canon law and 
Western Constitutionalism, 52 CATHOLIC HI STORICAL REV. 1 (1966). 
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the functions of this representative body were more legislative, or even 
judicial, 53 than they were executive. 
IV. CONCLUDTNG THOUGHTS ON WHAT Is A DYSFUNCTIONAL BOARD: Nu 
Once we rethink the function of the corporate board in terms of its 
historic origins, the analysis of what is a dysfunctional board, and 
whether the Hewlett-Packard board was dysfunctional, changes. 
To the extent that the function of the board is simply to provide 
institutional legitimacy by its very existence as an elected institution, 
then as long as an elected board is in place, the board has served its 
function. Under this analysis, the only board that is dysfunctional is a 
board that carries over following a deadlocked election. Indeed, 
corporate statutes that call for corporate dissolution in the event of 
repeated failure by evenly divided shareholders to elect new directors 54 
embody this view of the board's function. 
Perhaps, however, this view is too minimalist. Hence, one might ask 
when is an institution, whose principle purpose is to represent others, 
dysfunctional? In the context of Hewlett-Packard, the board members 
were at odds. Nevertheless, the same was true of the shareholders. If the 
function of the board is to represent the shareholders, did the dissention 
on the board render the board dysfunctional, or functional? True, the 
tactics of the competing sides had surpassed efforts at rational 
persuasion, as one side apparently engaged in leaking information to 
reporters, while the other engaged in illegal efforts to plug the leaks. 
Yet, except for the illegal pretenses, this seems to be ordinary to rough-
and-tumble politics. Indeed, one might even compliment the board on 
being engaged. 
Interestingly enough, this same issue of when a divided representative 
body should be condemned as "dysfunctional" pervades much of our 
current political discourse. Congress' approval rating hovers at record 
low levels, as politicians, pundits, and ordinary citizens all complain 
about the inability of Congress to get anything done. And yet, if 
Congress, a board , or any elected body truly represents a closely divided 
electorate, what is it supposed to do? In such cases, perhaps it is not the 
53. Medieval European Parliaments, town councils , and guild councils-often composed of a 
number of members that was some multiple of twelve -c ommonly adjudicated disputes, thereby 
providing the foundations of the jury system. See, e.g., REYNOLDS, supra note 49, at 23-3 4. The 
reintroduction of Roman law in the twelfth century led to the increasing use of single presiding judges in 
lieu of adjudication by collective groups, as had been characteristic of earlier medieval Europe. 
Resistance to this trend occurred in the preservation of trial by jury in England, and in mercantile 
matters , in which assemblie s or groups of merchants continued to t1y disputes. Id. at 5 1- 58. 
54. E.g., MODEL Bus.CORP.ACT§ l4 .30(2)( iii) (2005). 
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elected body that is dysfunctional. 
